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Abstract
Homeland security is a concept that has become firmly embedded in American society since the
events of September 11, 2001. While recent research has begun to study the implications of
homeland security in state and local law enforcement, few have focused on perceptions of
homeland security ideology, policy, and practice. Therefore, this study focuses on the impact that
homeland security ideology, policy, and practice has had on the local law enforcement
community by examining the varying levels of individual understanding, agreement, and support
for the concept. Moderate levels of agreement were found regarding homeland security clarity at
federal, state, and local levels of law enforcement. Variables measuring perceptions of
consistency and departmental involvement in implementing homeland security strategies, post
9/11 funding, homeland security training, and number of agency collaborations and training
activities were found to be the best predictors of perceived clarity. No demographic variables had
a significant impact on perceptions of homeland security clarity.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Even though terrorism has existed in multiple forms throughout history
(Barghothi, 2005), the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks by the international terrorist
group known as Al Qaeda against the United States has greatly contributed to an
increased focus on this issue in recent years. As a result, international terrorism has
become one of the most widely debated and controversial concepts (Rogers, Loewenthal,
Lewis, Amlot, Cinnirella, & Ansari, 2007; McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007).
Prior to the events of 9/11, however, most of our ideologies and policies directed
toward international terrorism were severely limited, based primarily on other countries’
experiences and media reports. In addition, they were considered to be uncoordinated and
lacking clear focus (Hoffman, 2001). Overall, little to no uniformity was seen across state
and local law enforcement agencies concerning responses to international terrorist
incidents, with existing policies placing heavy reliance on the federal government.
International terrorism research in the United States was also severely lacking and mostly
limited to studying domestic threats (Mullins, 1988; Rogers et al., 2007). The research
that did exist focused primarily on terrorism ideologies and typologies as opposed to
counterterrorism measures (Crenshaw, 2000; Gibbs, 1989; Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983).
The events of 9/11 ushered in a new wave of thinking about terrorism in the
United States. Massive restructuring of the federal government took place, such as swift
reform of existing agencies and the creation of multiple new agencies, in order to expand
the federal mandate to more substantially address the threat of international terrorism
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(McGarrell et al., 2007). New terrorism legislation was also enacted, such as the U.S.A.
PATRIOT Act that aimed at expanding police powers to investigate terrorism (Brown,
2007; Oliver, 2006; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). Restructuring of government agencies
not only occurred at the federal level, but also at state and local levels. Following the 9/11
attacks, homeland security policies and practices were extended to state and local law
enforcement agencies in order to more effectively consolidate resources and correct
major flaws in international terrorism defense. The events of 9/11 also prompted an
intense examination of the level of terrorist threat and activity around the world, signaling
a dramatic change in the world of terrorism research (Rogers et al., 2007). Instead of
continuing to rely solely on academic inquiries, research tasks were also given to
government entities in hopes of developing theories that could explain terrorist events.
Despite multiple attempts by government organizations and the academic
community to expand the existing body of international terrorism research, much is still
lacking. While some studies have attempted to address post 9/11 counterterrorism
strategies, the development of agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and their political and policy implications throughout the state and local law
enforcement community have yet to be thoroughly examined. Therefore, this study
focuses on the impact that homeland security ideology, policy, and practice has had on
the local law enforcement community by examining the varying levels of individual
understanding, agreement, and support for homeland security practices. More
specifically, it intends to extend the existing body of literature by considering the
potential influence that one’s perception of homeland security and terrorism can have on
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the implementation of counterterrorism policy, practice, and funding within local law
enforcement agencies.
The study then attempts to determine significant predictors of perceived clarity of
homeland security missions and goals of federal, state, and local (or departmental level)
law enforcement organizations as well as identify demographic, ideological, and practical
factors that may influence the nature of the these belief systems. In sum, the inquiry
poses the following questions: (1) is there consensus concerning the perceived missions
and goals of homeland security at the various law enforcement levels?; (2) what is the
relative level of agreement in regard to homeland security policy and practical
perceptions?; and (3) what factors significantly impact overall perceived mission and
strategic clarity of homeland security as an emergent law enforcement mandate?
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Chapter II
Literature Review
Terrorism is an ambiguous concept that may take many different forms and be
carried out for a variety of reasons (Barghothi, 2005; Cooper, 2008; Gibbs, 1989; Mahan
& Griset, 2008; Onwudiwe, 2001; Rogers et al., 2007; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010).
However, much of the debate surrounding terrorism comes from trying to find an allinclusive definition of such a broad concept. Currently, there is no single definition of
terrorism (Gibbs, 1989; Laqueur, 1999; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Spindlove & Simonsen,
2010). While the many forms that terrorism can take make it difficult to establish a
general definition, the difficulty in defining terrorism is further compounded by various
definitions for similar types of terrorism. This is made evident when comparing
government agency definitions and scholarly definitions for the same type of terrorism.
However, in order to fully understand the debate surrounding this concept, some of the
various definitions that have been formulated over time must be identified and
considered.
The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use
of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce
or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological” (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/7591.html).
Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), however, defines terrorism as “the
unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
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social objectives” (United States Department of Justice & The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, n.d.). It has also been defined by the United States Department of State as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets
by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”
(United States Department of State, 2003, p.1).
While these definitions do show some similarities, they differ in terms of what
features they emphasize in their respective definitions. Overall, it would seem that
agencies such as these define terrorism based on their own needs and scope of their legal
and investigative authority. For example, in their 2003 report National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, the State Department defined terrorism as “premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national
groups or clandestine agents” (p. 1). While it is not specified in their definition, the State
Department elaborates in their report by extending the scope of their interests to
international terrorism by only collecting data on these types of incidents (Sandler &
Enders, 2007). This is also made evident by the FBI, which has separate definitions for
both domestic and international terrorism (United States Department of Justice and The
Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).
Just as variations are seen among government agency definitions of terrorism,
variability exists among scholarly definitions as well. For example, Li and Schaub
(2004), Cooper (2008), Gibbs (1989), and Sandler and Enders (2007) have all postulated
definitions of terrorism. As previously illustrated in the non-scholarly literature, there is
no single definition of terrorism. Even though there are inherent differences among the

5

various definitions, the concept of terrorism does have basic commonalities (Mahan &
Griset, 2008).
Evolution of Terrorist Strategies: Differing Varieties
Terrorism scholarship is typically separated into two eras: historical and modern
(Barghothi 2005; Laqueur, 1999; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010;
Weinzierl, 2004). Historical terrorism most commonly refers to terrorist acts occurring
before the 20th century (Barghothi, 2005). These early forms of terrorism were primarily
religiously motivated. As a result, the goal of terrorist groups during this era was to not
only influence the masses, but the Gods as well (Barghothi, 2005; Mahan & Griset, 2008;
Weinzierl, 2004).
Modern terrorism, on the other hand, typically refers to terrorist activity occurring
during and after the late 19th and 20th centuries (Barghothi, 2005; Laqueur, 1999;
Weinziernl, 2004). While some modern terrorist groups exhibit the religious fervor that
was prominent among historical terrorist groups, seldom are modern terrorists’ actions
strictly religious. They also include elements of political and/or social motivation
(Barghothi, 2005). Historically, nationalism is another prominent motive that is seen
among modern terrorist groups, with the objective being statehood and legitimate
recognition for the involved nationalities (Weinzierl, 2004). The war crimes committed
by Hitler and the Nazis during World War II as well as the development of the Ku Klux
Klan illustrate another prominent theme of modern terrorists, maintaining the status quo.
Even though social and political motivations are much more prominent among
modern terrorists than their historical forerunners, they still exhibit some of the religious
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overtones that were prominent among these earlier groups. What separates these modern
groups from their historical counterparts, however, is the fact that their cited religious
motivations are commonly used to shadow the political or social agendas of the group
(Mahan & Griset, 2008). The events of 9/11, for example, have been linked to Islamist
fascism, which is an extremist view of Islam, demanding complete adherence to the
sacred law of Islam (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). Even though a religious overtone
was prominent in the 9/11 attacks, other factors such as the rejection of western societal
norms and political practices were stated as motivational influences. In all, this illustrates
that attacks such as these consist of numerous motivations that are inherently different
than those which consist of strictly religious overtones that were prominent in earlier
terrorist events.
These terrorist activities can be sponsored by state actors (Mahan & Griset, 2008),
non-state actors (Barghothi, 2005), or by domestic actors as defined by the FBI as
“groups of individuals who are based and operate entirely in the United States and Puerto
Rico without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at elements of the United
States government or population” (United States Department of Justice and The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Domestic terrorist groups in the United States typically
consist of left wing idealist groups such as animal rights activists and environmentalists,
right wing extremists such as neo-Nazi groups, or special interest groups such as those
that target abortion clinics (Mahan & Griset, 2008; Mullins, 1988). Some notable
domestic terrorists are Ted Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, and Timothy
McVeigh, one of the individuals who were convicted of bombing the Alfred P. Murrah
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Federal Building in 1995. Prior to the events of 9/11, domestic terrorism accounted for
the majority of the terrorism concern in the United States (Mullins, 1988).
By contrast, international terrorism, also known as transnational terrorism, refers
to terrorist activity that crosses national borders. The FBI, for example, defines
international terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or
individual, who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend
national boundaries, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives” (United States Department of Justice and The Federal Bureau of
Investigation, n.d.). Basically, a transnational terrorist incident in a country involves
victims, perpetrators, targets, or institutions of another country (Li & Schaub, 2004).
Lately, international terrorism has emerged as a prime security concern that many claim
requires bold new strategies because of its incalculable dangers (Daase & Kessler, 2007).
Pre 9/11 Terrorism in the United States: Ideology, Policy, and Practice
Prior to the events of 9/11, terrorism research in the United States was limited. A
general interest in terrorism was not reflected in the works of American social scientists
(Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983). Furthermore, theoretical formulations that did exist were
for the most part preoccupied with studying terrorism definitions and typologies
(Crenshaw, 2000; Gibbs, 1989; Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983). Most of our ideologies of
international terrorism were based on other countries’ experiences and media reports.
While some research did attempt to correct such flaws (Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983), an
overall concern for terrorism was significantly lacking in academic research. The
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research that did exist consisted of underdeveloped psychological approaches and
theories unsupported by empirical research (Danieli, Brom, & Sills, 2005). During this
era, terrorism research was geared primarily toward domestic threats (Mullins, 1988). As
a result, terrorism did not seem to be a prominent threat to our society. Most of this,
however, was most likely related to the classification of certain terrorist acts by
government agencies. Before 9/11, the FBI, for example, did not always separate
elements of a crime that might constitute terrorism from regular criminal activity. Instead,
data collected on what might have been terrorist activity was sometimes categorized as
regular crimes in the Uniform Crime Report (White, 2006).
The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
was the largest scale terrorist incident on United States’ soil prior to 9/11 (U.S.
Department of Justice, Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons learned for the
States). However, following terrorist attacks such as the one against the U.S.S. Cole in
2001, many started to question the effectiveness of terrorism policies at that time. Polices
prior to the events of 9/11 were considered to be fragmented and extremely
uncoordinated and consisted of overlapping responsibilities, duplication of efforts, and
lacked an overall clear focus (Hoffman, 2001). Furthermore, counterterrorism measures
at the time were often geared toward recovering from attacks, and the best course of
action was viewed as a direct strike against those responsible for the terrorist acts
(Cordesman, Parachini, Hoffman, & Eland 2000; 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).
Of the existing policies and procedures, most were limited to the federal
government, with little to no uniformity seen among the states regarding responses to
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terrorist incidents. Policies that did exist relied heavily on federal assistance and other
countries’ experiences with terrorist activity. For example, the Pentagon first became
concerned with terrorism as a result of hostage taking. This was due to several instances
in the 1970s, including the hijacking of an Air France plane in 1976 by Palestinian
terrorists and a Lufthansa plane in Mogadishu in 1977 (9/11 Commission Report, 2004).
In both instances, Israeli and German Special Forces stormed the planes, killing all
terrorists and rescuing all but one hostage. As a result, the United States took notice,
creating the Delta Force whose mission was hostage rescue (9/11 Commission Report,
2004). International terrorism policies and procedures prior to 9/11 were considered to be
reactive as well. It was not until the 1983 Hezbollah attack against Marines stationed in
Beirut that customary procedures were put in place for troops to follow when deployed
abroad, such as watching for strange cars and unknown aircraft overhead (9/11
Commission Report, 2004).
Even though there were considerable issues concerning pre 9/11 terrorism policies
and practices, the importance of extending the scope of counterterrorism responsibilities
was recognized. To begin with, instead of trying to combat terrorism with immediate
force or a direct strike, recommendations were made to take a more democratic approach.
It was also recommended that policies and practices be extended to include more reliance
on state and local law enforcement agencies (Cordesman et al., 2000). For example, in
1999, California published a terrorism response plan that outlined responsibilities for first
responders, such as local and state law enforcement, until federal agencies could arrive
and take over the scene (Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 1999). The
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responsibilities were even broken down by purpose, objectives, and a hierarchal chain of
command for the involved agencies.
Post 9/11 Homeland Security in the United States: Ideology, Policy, and Practice
On the morning of September 11, 2001, members of a Middle-Eastern terrorist
group known as Al-Qaeda hijacked four American Airlines Flights. Two of the planes
were flown into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City, one plane was flown into the west wall of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and
the fourth crashed in a field outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. In all, nearly 3,000
people were killed in the attacks, most of them civilians. The death toll on 9/11 surpassed
that of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, making it the deadliest
attack on American soil (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). It has even been called “an act of
war against the United States and its allies, and against the very idea of civilized society”
(United States Department of State, 2003, p. 1).
The events of 9/11 resulted in a new wave of thinking about terrorism in the
United States. As previously stated, prior to the events of 9/11, discourse concerning
international terrorism ideology, policy, and practice were extremely limited (Rogers et
al., 2007). While prior to 9/11 most states had in place some form of services to provide
assistance to individuals involved in criminal activity, the magnitude of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks were so great that many states were not prepared to handle the repercussions (U.S.
Department of Justice, Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons learned for the
States). As a result, these attacks prompted an immediate and virtually unanimous
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reaction among the public that the United States should take whatever steps necessary to
strike back at the terrorists and to prevent recurrences of such events (Brady, 2004).
Massive restructuring was seen among multiple areas of the federal government,
especially among federal law enforcement (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006). For example,
restructuring was seen in several federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as the creation of new
agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation and Safety
Administration (Brown, 2007; McGarrell et al., 2007; White, 2006). Dramatic change
was witnessed in the legislative arena as well. Counterterrorism legislation, most notably
the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, was passed at break-neck speed, granting law enforcement an
increased amount of power and authority (Brown, 2007; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Oliver,
2006; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010; White, 2006).
The events of 9/11 prompted an intense examination of the level of terrorist threat
and activity around the world, signaling a dramatic change in the world of terrorism
research (Rogers et al., 2007). Instead of continuing to rely solely on academic inquiries,
research tasks were also given to government entities in hopes of developing theories that
could explain terrorist events. Shortly following the events of 9/11 and an increased focus
on international terrorism research, the term “homeland security” emerged and quickly
became a symbol firmly embedded in American society (Maxwell, 2005, p. 157).
Homeland security is a term used after the 9/11 attacks to describe defense within
American borders (The Office of Homeland Security, 2002; White, 2006). The directives
of homeland security are illustrated in its official definition, which is “a concerted
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national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do
occur” (The Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 2). However, just as the definition of
terrorism varies, the same can be said for the concept of homeland security. For example,
while most view it as representing the need to effectively provide for the safety of United
States’ citizens and those within the nation’s borders, politicians may see it as a series of
organizational challenges, a mandate of efficiency in a decentralized environment, and an
overall requirement for improved means of communication and coordination (Maxwell,
2005). Simply put, however, the concept of homeland security means keeping the country
safe (White, 2006).
As previously mentioned, the events of 9/11 ushered in massive change and
restructuring of government, especially at the federal level. Due to this dramatic change,
a new agency was created in 2002, known as the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). As made evident in the previously mentioned definitions of the concept of
homeland security, three strategic objectives are identified by the DHS, including
preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimizing damage and recovering from attacks (The Office of Homeland Security,
2002). The DHS also has five major directives which are information analysis and
infrastructure protection, border and transportation security, emergency preparedness and
response, science and technology, and management (Davies, Plotkin, Filler, Flynn,
Foresman, Litzinger, McCarthy, & Wiseman, 2005). Multiple agencies were created or
restructured to fit under the DHS vision. These agencies consisted of, but were not
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limited to Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS),
United States Coast Guard, United States Secret Service, and the Office of the Inspector
General (http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm). Overall, 22 agencies were merged into what is
referred to as a “cohesive” department (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010).
The idea behind such restructuring and placement of agencies under the DHS was
that it would ensure greater accountability over critical homeland security missions and
unity of purpose among agencies responsible for them (The Office of Homeland Security,
2002). While a great deal of restructuring was seen at the federal level, the DHS furthered
their post-9/11 counterterrorism polices by extending its mandate to include state and
local law enforcement agencies. For example, joint terrorism task forces and data
information collection centers were set up throughout the nation in order to aid in this
extension of counterterrorism policies and practices. Furthermore, even though a large
part of the DHS mandate is to improve coordination of all aspects of information
gathering and sharing at federal, state, and local levels, it also identifies priorities and
educates the public as to threats and appropriate precautions and responses as part of its
public affairs function (Feinberg, 2002). In essence, “the DHS leverages resources within
federal, state, and local governments, coordinating the transition of multiple agencies and
programs into a single, integrated agency, focused on protecting the American people and
their homeland” (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010, p. 27). Funding for such a massive
undertaking has been exponential. For example, the United States government has
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budgeted over $55 billion for the federal agencies alone under the DHS for the year 2010
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
Following the events of 9/11, an aggressive attempt was also made by Congress to
enact new pieces of legislation that effectively addressed the issue of terrorism in our
society. Out of the legislation, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act emerged as one of the most
sweeping new laws (Feinberg, 2002). The name is an acronym for United and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (Brown, 2007; Feinberg, 2002; Oliver, 2006; Spindlove & Simonsen,
2010; White, 2006). This statute, which came into law on October 26, 2001, was aimed at
expanding police powers to investigate terrorism in the Homeland (Brown, 2007; Oliver,
2006; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010).
The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act is broken down into ten titles, or sections, outlining
these new powers. The first nine titles encompass an array of new mandates and
procedures ranging from enhancing domestic security, surveillance procedures for law
enforcement, border security, intelligence and information gathering, international money
laundering, providing for the families and victims of 9/11, strengthening of criminal laws
against terrorism, and a vast range of other counterterrorism and homeland security
related issues (Brown, 2007; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010; White, 2006). While the
aforementioned nine titles specifically outline their aims and objectives, the last section is
entitled Miscellaneous. Even though it is considered crucial to the PATRIOT Act, it
includes information from an array of areas including a “review of the Department of
Justice, grant programs for state and local preparedness support, and critical
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infrastructure protection” (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010, p. 26). In sum, the law gives
officials greater authority to track and intercept communications for law enforcement and
intelligence gathering purposes, as well as enhanced surveillance procedures in an
attempt to combat terrorism.
While supporters of the law believe that it provides a critical law enforcement tool
for combating terrorism, others feel that it infringes on civil liberties. For example, some
of the most hotly debated practices of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act are found in Title II,
Enhanced Surveillance Procedures (Brown, 2007). This section of the PATRIOT ACT
deals with the sharing of criminal intelligence and the authority of law enforcement
agencies to conduct wiretapping and electronic surveillance being expanded. Proponents
argue that this title allows for law enforcement and government officials to better combat
instances of terrorism and protect our country. However, those opposed to the law argue
that the expanded police powers go too far and infringe on civil liberties outlined in the
Constitution (White, 2006). The debate surrounding the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act is not
limited to the expanded law enforcement powers outlined in Title II. Concerns have been
addressed by civil libertarians, racial/ethnic minorities, and immigrants also concerned
with multiple areas of the law, including wiretapping of telephones, monitoring internet
activity, the surveillance of religious gatherings, extensive searches of homes, and
detaining people for extended periods of time without filing charges or granting them
access to legal counsel (Brown, 2007).
Homeland Security in Local Law Enforcement
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Just like federal agencies, local law enforcement agencies play a crucial role in
the homeland security mission. However, there is typically not much uniformity among
police departments. This is evident when looking at how homeland security funding and
grants are awarded to local agencies. For example, in order to gain accessibility to DHS
funding and assistance, local police departments must go through their state homeland
security authority. However, the decision on how to allocate the police agency’s
resources and set priorities for terrorism prevention and preparedness fall to local law
enforcement. This is also influenced by the officer in charge of allocating the funding.
Depending on their perceptions of threat, terrorism ideology, or needs of the agency,
funding may be allocated accordingly (Davies et al., 2005).
Even though variability is often seen among the homeland security programs and
practices implemented at the local level, most local law enforcement roles in homeland
security include several specific criteria. First, the role of local law enforcement in
homeland security is achieved primarily through typical crime control duties of local
police officers (Oliver, 2006). This may include the enforcement of criminal law, traffic
law, or through extra or preventative patrols. Second, tactics and technology are crucial to
the role of local law enforcement in combating terrorism. Typically, this takes the form of
intelligence gathering and surveillance of potential terrorist threats. However, this can
also be extended to data collection and analysis of other law enforcement activities. For
example, calls for service, offense reports, arrests, field interview information, citations,
accidents, traffic stops, domestic violence, hate crimes, confidential informant
information, and citizen tips can all be analyzed in order look for patterns of increased
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criminal activity pertaining to potential threats of terrorism (Chapman, Baker, Bezdikian,
Cammarata, Cohen, Leach, Schapiro, Scheider, & Varano, 2002).
Some agencies, however, have taken this one step further by extending the scope
of their efforts to include crime mapping. For example, project CLEAR in Chicago uses
such technology to identify critical facilities in the wake of terrorist attacks (Chapman et
al., 2002). This program, which collects and analyzes data on targets such as buildings,
bridges, and water treatment facilities, has the ability to immediately map what are
considered to be critical locations. Officers are then dispersed accordingly to the select
targets and deploy target hardening techniques, such as extra patrols and security
(Chapman et al., 2002). The creation of partnerships among law enforcement agencies
falls under this category as well. As previously stated, homeland security calls for
uniformity among agencies concerning the threat of terrorism (The Office of Homeland
Security, 2002). In order to achieve this goal, law enforcement collaborations such as
joint terrorism task forces, drug task forces, and fugitive task forces have been
established that include local, state, and federal law enforcement (Davies et al., 2005).
Furthermore, local law enforcement agencies must have some type of emergency
management plan in place in order to properly handle large-scale crises (Oliver, 2006).
Finally, training is crucial for law enforcement under homeland security. Many have
recognized the need for increased law enforcement training in the areas of the handling of
biological or chemical weapons, technology, and information and intelligence gathering
and sharing techniques (Chapman et al., 2002; Davies et al., 2005; Oliver, 2006).
Homeland Security Research
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Even though there are obvious advantages to extending the role of terrorism
prevention to local law enforcement agencies, there are some repercussions. A study
conducted by Thatcher (2002) outlines some of these challenges. As previously stated,
many critics of post 9/11 terrorism policies and practices, such as the U.S.A. PATRIOT
Act, believe that expanded law enforcement powers and investigative authority infringe
on individual civil liberties and disproportionately target certain groups (Brown, 2007;
White, 2006). Thatcher (2002), however, argues that this is due to the “fragmented and
decentralized nature of the American government’s role in homeland security” (p. 636).
In order to test the belief that homeland security policies and practices disproportionately
target certain racial/ethnic groups, he conducted a study of the Dearborn, Michigan Police
Department and their proactive approach to combating terrorism. Dearborn was chosen
for the study because it has one of the nation’s largest concentrations of Arab Americans,
and as a result has received a great deal of attention since the events of 9/11 (Thatcher,
2002). For example, of the 98,000 residents, over 29,000 claimed to be Arabic on the last
census.
As the role of local law enforcement agencies suggests, they are responsible for
the safety and security of particular territories. As a result, this can take the form of
conflict between their homeland security responsibilities and the safety of the
community. Thatcher (2002) identifies this as conflict among the distinction of
community protection and offender search. Community protection refers to practices
such as target hardening or extra patrols in order to prevent terrorist activity, while
offender search refers to the investigation of certain people in order to take a proactive
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approach to preventing an attack. Basically, the line between the two may become
blurred when dealing with communities that have somewhat larger than normal
concentrations of certain racial/ethnic groups, such as in Dearborn, Michigan (Thatcher,
2002). In order to investigate what shapes the city’s interests in the local role of
homeland security, Thatcher gathered information through interviews, observations, and
documented reviews. Four major areas were focused on during the study. These areas
consisted of the city’s response to the threat of hate crimes after 9/11, its response to
media attention after the attacks, its decision about the role it would play in federal
interviews with recent immigrants about terrorism, and its creation of a local homeland
security office (Thatcher, 2002).
Results of the study concluded that local politics influenced many of the city
government’s perceptions, which inadvertently filtered down into law enforcement
practices. Thatcher (2002) stated that throughout the study, city officials and citizens
alike expressed more concern about their honor and how their community would be
viewed. An increase in concern for police legitimacy was also seen due to the increased
investigations and surveillance efforts by local law enforcement. This sentiment also
filtered into perceptions of the media as well, due to the homeland security practices and
the high volume of Arab Americans in the community. Overall, “the Dearborn case
contributes to the implications that local law enforcement roles in homeland security can
have by illustrating how surveillance and information-gathering can have chilling effects
on a city’s social life that may undermine trust and cooperation with police” (Thatcher,
2002, p. 644).
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Studies such as Thatcher’s (2002) point out potential flaws concerning homeland
security policies and practices. Other studies, however, are concerned with the effect that
homeland security may have on changing the overall face of local law enforcement. One
of the most critical questions that scholars and law enforcement practitioners have
attempted to address is whether homeland security could be achieved through traditional
community policing practices, or if policing for homeland security is inherently different
(Oliver, 2009). For example, Oliver (2006) and Brown (2007) state that homeland
security policies and strategies are so inherently different from anything that the law
enforcement community has experienced before that it has ushered in a new era of
policing.
In modern society, American policing has gone through three different eras.
These eras are political, reform, and community policing. Furthermore, these eras are also
said to consist of one of four different models of policing, which are typically identified
as traditional, community policing, problem-oriented, and zero-tolerance (Oliver, 2006).
However, due to the implementation of homeland security policies and practices, local
law enforcement agencies are using aggressive and invasive tactics that are not inherent
to any these eras of policing (Brown, 2007). As a result, Oliver (2006) states that we have
entered a new era of policing, known as “homeland security.” To support this claim, the
argument is made that this new shift in policing is due largely to national and
international threats of terrorism, sparked by the events of 9/11. In turn, this has sparked
citizen interest in the topic, and as a result the public has lent more support to combating
terrorism. This has also caused a change in traditional policing policy and practice in
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order to meet such demands. For example, the community policing era was marked by
police involvement in the community, strong relationships between police and citizens,
and focus on traditional, as well as quality of life criminal offenses. However, under the
homeland security directive, police agencies are much more professional. While
relationships are remote like the ones reflective of the reform policing era, the
professional relationship of police with the community are geared strictly toward
information gathering and are intelligence driven (Oliver, 2006).
In conclusion, Oliver (2006) lists five criteria that the homeland security era of
policing must meet. The first is that the role of homeland security policing in terms of
prevention will be intelligence driven. Second, the power of police under homeland
security may pose a risk to civil liberties. For example, Oliver (2006) states that a fine
line exists between targeting terrorists for criminal violations versus blanketing
neighborhoods in search for specific suspects in large populations (p. 60). This is further
reiterated by the Thatcher (2002) study in Dearborn, Michigan. Third, homeland security
policing necessitates that the bar for training and hiring police officers be raised. More
specifically, officers will need to become familiar in areas such as intelligence gathering,
the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and how to properly respond to mass casualty
events (Oliver, 2006). Finally, communication between police management and line
officers, as well as lateral and vertical communication among local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies will be crucial to the success of homeland security policing.
While Oliver (2006) focuses on a potential shift in the eras of policing due to
homeland security policies and practices, Brown (2007) focuses on what is referred to as
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community-oriented terrorism. In his study, Brown (2007) notes that the extended law
enforcement powers under the homeland security directive, such as wiretapping,
monitoring internet activity, the surveillance of religious gatherings, and detaining
individuals for long periods of time “do generate concern among civil libertarians and
racial/ethnic minorities, as well as violate the basic principles of community policing” (p.
240). Even though it is noted that there is an ideological change among law enforcement,
evidence is provided that this might not necessarily usher in a new era of policing, but
reiterate the importance of the role of the community in combating criminal activity,
more specifically terrorism. For example, Brown (2007) states that aggressive and
invasive tactics have proven to be ineffective in combating traditional criminal activity.
While such tactics may be inherent to the nature of homeland security policies, they have
the ability to alienate the public, causing distrust and sentiment toward law enforcement
(Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Thatcher, 2002). As a result, policies and practices such as
these that cause a divide between law enforcement and the public will ultimately fail. In
order to fix this problem, Brown (2007) suggests that “technologically advanced
investigative and intelligence gathering techniques are no substitute for a cooperative
public.” (p. 246). Therefore, “including the public in combating terrorism and using the
community-oriented policing methods to gather intelligence would not only yield quality
intelligence, but also reduce the abuse of government power” (Brown, 2007, p. 247),
which are currently two major critiques of homeland security and the U.S.A. PATRIOT
Act.
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Just as there is disagreement in regard to how homeland security ideology and
policies have affected local law enforcement’s relationship with the public, there has also
been debate concerning the exact role that local law enforcement will play in a post 9/11
environment. As the aforementioned literature suggests, there have been dramatic
changes, especially in local law enforcement since the events of 9/11 (Brown, 2007;
Oliver, 2006; Thatcher, 2002). These are most exemplified in the DHS’ National Strategy
for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002). This document outlines
potential roles that local law enforcement may play in regard to terrorist threats, such as
intelligence gathering, domestic counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructure,
emergency preparedness and response, and information sharing (Office of Homeland
Security, 2002; Oliver, 2009). Even though reports such as this have emphasized a strong
role for local law enforcement, specifically how this level of law enforcement would
change has not been very clear (Oliver, 2009). For example, while the events of 9/11
showed that police will play an active role as first responders in the event of a terrorist
attack, since 9/11 some agencies have become primarily focused on other activities such
as intelligence gathering and similar policing tactics (Oliver, 2009). More specifically,
larger policing strategies have been outlined, but not the exact actions that police need to
take. While local agencies have been given significant responsibility in responding to
terrorist attacks, little direction has been given on how to achieve such a task (Pelfrey,
2009).
As previously stated, research on homeland security ideologies, policies, and
practices in local law enforcement is still limited at best (Oliver, 2009; Schafer, Burruss,
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& Giblin, 2009; Stewart & Morris, 2009). Even though existing research has outlined
practices in which local agencies have become involved, very few scholarly studies have
attempted to determine what affects the implementation of such policies and practices
(Oliver, 2009; Pelfrey, 2009; Schafer et al., 2009; Stewart & Morris, 2009). Schafer,
Burruss, and Giblin (2009) attempted to determine what affects the implementation of
homeland security policies and practices by surveying municipal departments in the state
of Illinois. Since the events of 9/11, urban departments have been the main focus of
studies concerned with homeland security in these local agencies, with little or no
attention given to small departments (Schafer et al., 2009). In order to address this issue,
Schafer, Burruss and Giblin (2009) surveyed small departments, defined as those
employing nine or fewer full time sworn officers (Schafer et al., 2009). More specifically,
the study attempted to identify shifts in operations and perception of preparedness to
critical incidents in their jurisdiction post 9/11.
In order to evaluate perception of risk of being targeted for a terrorist attack,
respondents were asked to rate their perception on a scale of 1 (not at all likely) to 10
(very likely) (Schafer et al., 2009). Findings from the study indicated the average
perceived risk of being the target of a terrorist attack to be relatively low, with most
variation in small rural departments as opposed to small metropolitan agencies.
Concerning measures to enhance homeland security preparation and responsiveness,
programs such as task forces and the creation of special units that required extensive
devotion proved to be uncommon, with training being the most common step taken
across the surveyed departments (Schafer et al, 2009). Furthermore, training, grant
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funding, and equipment acquisition were found to be common concerns mentioned by
respondents. Overall, agencies in the study reported modest perceptions concerning their
preparedness to respond to a critical incident, with modest policy changes being
implemented since 9/11 (Shafer et al., 2009). While the author speculates that this may be
related to low perception of risk of being targeted, it is noted that more research is needed
in the field.
A similar study conducted by Stewart and Morris (2009) surveyed a sample of
208 police chiefs in the state of Texas concerning perceptions of homeland security in
local law enforcement and factors influencing those perceptions. Respondents were asked
a series of questions regarding perceptions of homeland security as the dominant strategy
in their department, homeland security as the dominant practice in the police institution,
demographic variables on the chiefs’ respective departments, the extent of homeland
security-related initiatives in their departments, perceptions concerning the level of
collaboration between their organization and federal agencies, homeland security
preparedness within their agency, and their perceived likelihood of terrorist incidents
within their jurisdiction (Stewart & Morris, 2009).
Results from the study indicated that there is a higher level of agreement among
chiefs that homeland security is the dominant policing strategy in the police institution as
opposed to the overriding strategy in their department (Stewart & Morris, 2009). One’s
opinion of whether or not homeland security was dominant in the police institution was
also found to be a significant predictor of the perception of dominance of homeland
security in their respective departments and vice versa. Other factors such as federal
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collaboration, preparedness, and perceptions of risk were also found to have significant
positive effects regarding the level of agreement that homeland security is the dominant
policing strategy in their department (Stewart & Morris, 2009). Agency size was the only
structural variable to have a significant effect on perceptions of homeland security being
the dominant departmental strategy, with chiefs of smaller departments in more
agreement than their counterparts in larger departments. Overall, the less prepared a chief
believed their own department to be in terms of homeland security, the more likely they
were to believe that the overriding strategy in the police institution was homeland
security (Stewart & Morris, 2009). Furthermore, the belief of what other agencies were
doing in terms of homeland security affected how chiefs viewed homeland security in
their own agencies.
Ambiguity still exists with both the concept of terrorism (in its various forms) and
homeland security. This confusion is only heightened by the perceived role that local
governments play as opposed to the federal government. The recent supposition
suggesting that the “homeland security” era may comprise the fourth era of policing
potentially modifies the Kelling and Moore typology of first the political era, the reform
era, and the community-oriented era (Oliver, 2006; Stewart & Morris, 2009). Noting that
substantial disagreement still exists among the proper role and benefits of communityoriented policing, it is no surprise that similar differences in the discourse concerning
homeland security exist. Therefore, this research extends this debate by examining the
level of consensus concerning homeland security ideology, policy, and practice and
attempts to isolate the most salient predictors which indicate support for the concept.
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Chapter III
Methodology
Data for this study comes from a quantitative, electronic survey of individuals
listed as members of the Tennessee Chiefs’ of Police Association (TCPA). As such, the
initial sampling frame contained 2,457 email addresses of individuals with various levels
of police involvement. The survey instrument itself captured their respective roles as law
enforcement supporters or professionals. Utilizing the Speed-Survey software and
website, a list-serve was created and the entire sampling frame was entered. The purpose
of this research was to determine if a general consensus existed among local law
enforcement agencies regarding homeland security objectives and strategies.
Furthermore, the research attempted to establish if a relative level of agreement exists in
regard to homeland security policy and practical perceptions, as well as identify factors
that significantly impact overall perceived mission and strategic clarity of homeland
security as an emergent law enforcement mandate. The research approach considered
individual perceptions across a broad cross-section of law enforcement participants
throughout the entire State, ensuring some amount of regional diversity. Furthermore, the
sampling frame was deemed relevant to the descriptive and exploratory research purpose
by sampling individuals associated with the largest, professional association for law
enforcement in Tennessee – TCPA.
Instrumentation and Major Variables
In order to produce relevant findings, the survey was constructed after reviewing
past research and instrumentation used in other similar studies (Western Carolina
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University, 2006; International City/County Management Association, 2005; The Council
of State Governments & Eastern Kentucky University, 2006). Most of the scholarly
research in the area of homeland security perceptions and practices has been conducted
on a national level; therefore, the content of national instruments was modified by using
smaller scale state surveys and questions deemed relevant to the overall purpose of the
present inquiry. The survey looked for general disagreement among respondents as the
ideology, rationale, and practice of homeland security at the local level. It also asked
respondents to report on both formal and informal departmental policies on homeland
security. Further survey items addressed homeland security activities, training, and
expenditures, and general demographic information on officers, agencies, and the
communities policed. A copy of the survey instruments can be found in Appendix A.
Procedure
During the second week of February 2010, the survey was forwarded to
individuals on the TCPA member list. A message was included in the email that
contained information regarding survey sponsorship, objectives, and purposes. Potential
recipients were also assured concerning issues of anonymity and confidentiality as well
as information regarding researcher adherence to required processes regarding
involvement of human subjects in social research. In an effort to increase the response
rate, the initial email mentioned two important organizations as co-sponsors – the Law
Enforcement Innovation Center (LEIC) and the Southeastern Command and Leadership
Academy (SECLA). Both entities are well recognized and respected across the State as
important professional associations for law enforcement. After one week, approximately
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120 individuals had responded to the survey. Furthermore, the useable sampling frame
was reduced to 1,938 due to invalid or unreachable email addresses. It is expected that
many of the survey announcements were received as “spam mail”, one of the major
drawbacks to electronic survey delivery. Therefore, considering the valid sample frame,
the first wave response rate was 6.2%. Two subsequent waves of the survey were
delivered during the third and fourth weeks of February. The administration of wave two
included the addition of TCPA as one of the sponsoring agencies, after they had provided
their consent to be listed. This was done in an effort to increase the number of useable
surveys. At the end of wave two 205 surveys had been completed, which increased the
overall response rate to 10.6%.
A final administration of the survey was conducted in the last week of February.
The email announcement was appropriately amended and indicated to non-respondents
that this was the last email that they would receive. The third wave produced 93
additional responses (a total of 294 respondents) which increased the final response rate
to 15.2%. This final response rate reflects a percentage related to the population of TCPA
members and appropriately represents a percentage of a population. Therefore,
generalizations can certainly be made to TCPA member perceptions, and to a more
limited degree, to officers across the State. Finally, since the Speed-Survey apparatus
does not allow for the same email address to complete the survey in subsequent
deliveries, the researchers remained reasonably assured that there were no duplicate
surveys contained in the data.
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Chapter IV
Results and Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
Frequency distributions were run on all demographic variables in the study, which
can be found in Table 1. Results indicated that a majority of respondents worked for a
municipal law enforcement agency (53%), within an urban jurisdiction (51%), and were
from an agency that employed 100+ full-time, sworn staff (50%). Concerning officer’s
role within the agency, numbers were dispersed relatively evenly across all categories,
with about 28% in a field or part field/part administrative position and 27% in a strictly
administrative role, potentially allowing for a high level of generalizability of the survey
throughout multiple levels of local law enforcement. Results also indicated that most
respondents were experienced law enforcement professionals, with 44% and 53%
reporting that they have worked for their respective agency and in their current profession
for 16+ years. Most respondents also reported to be between the ages of 41-50 (40%).
Furthermore, 85% were white, and 81% were male, with just under 50% having a college
degree.
Descriptive statistics were performed on continuous and discrete variables in the
study, which can be found in Tables 2 and 2A. First, descriptive statistics were conducted
on all homeland security ideological variables. On a scale from 1-3 (with 1 representing
the least amount of importance and 3 representing the most amount of importance),
respondents were asked to state their perception of the importance of prevention,
protection, and preparation at both federal and local levels. Results indicated an average
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Table 1:
Demographic/ Organizational Characteristics of Sample
N

% (Valid)

154
57
4
3
5
66

53.3
19.7
1.4
1.0
1.7
22.8

76
68
144

26.4
23.6
50.0

147
66
75

51.0
22.9
26.0

82
84
80
45

28.2
28.9
27.5
15.5

39
56
68
128

13.4
19.2
23.4
44.0

25
57
53
156

8.6
19.6
18.2
53.6

6
79
118
88

2.1
27.1
40.5
30.2

19
247
10
13

6.6
85.5
3.5
4.5

235
53

81.6
18.4

18
127
143

6.3
44.1
49.7

Variable
Type of Agency
Municipal
County
Consolidated
Emergency/medical
Fire/Safety
Other
Approximately Number of Staff
0-30
31-99
100 +
Type of Jurisdiction
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Role in Agency
Field position
Part field/Part Administration
Administrative Position
Other
Years Working in Agency
1-5
6-10
11-15
16 +
Years in Current Profession
1-5
6-10
11-15
16 +
Age
21-30
31-40
41-50
51 +
Race
Black
White
Hispanic
Other
Gender
Male
Female
Education Level
HS/GED
Some College
College Degree
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response of about “2” across all categories, reflecting a modest level of agreement
concerning importance of all variables. Respondents were also asked to report the level of
emphasis placed on homeland security in their department on a scale of 1-4 (1
Table 2:
Descriptive Statistics of Homeland Security Survey (n=294)
Range
Mean
SD
N
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Item
HS Ideology
Import of Prevention at Federal Level
Import of Protection at Federal Level
Import of Preparation at Federal Level
Import of Prevention at Department Level
Import of Protection at Department Level
Import of Preparation at Departmental Level

3-1
(most
- least)

2.63
2.16
2.18
2.17
2.17
2.27

.638
.701
.799
.785
.714
.796

291
289
287
289
289
289

Emphasis on HS at Departmental Level

4-1 (high No)

2.84

.848

291

Agreement that DHS mission is clear
Agreement that HS state/local mission is clear
Agreement that HS department mission is clear
Agreement that local HS mandate should be same as DHS
Agreement that local HS training is as important as DHS
Agreement that local threat info is an important as DHS
Consistency of HS practices throughout the state
Consistency of HS practices and overall state mission
Consistency of HS activities and mission in department

5-1 (strongest least agreement)

3.22
3.13
3.17
3.87
4.33
4.48
2.92
3.20
3.30

1.07
1.01
1.13
1.21
1.00
.878
1.09
.957
1.10

292
292
293
293
292
293
292
291
292

Import of emergency preparedness at local level
Import of terrorism prevention at local level
Import of border patrol at local level
Import of disaster relief at local level

5-1 (highest lowest)

4.29
3.63
2.74
3.66

1.03
1.24
1.56
1.10

286
288
285
285

Greatest potential threat to federal government
Threat to critical infrastructure
Threat to public health
Threat to buildings/installations
None
Greatest potential threat to local government
Threat to critical infrastructure
Threat to public health
Threat to buildings/installations
None

146(50%)
104(35%)
38(13%)
5(2%)
107(36%)
122(42%)
56(19%)
8(3%)

Note: All percentages represent valid ones, and descriptive statistics have been rounded to nearest whole number.

representing low emphasis and 4 representing high emphasis). An average of 2.8,
suggesting a slightly higher than moderate emphasis on homeland security at the
departmental level, was indicated.
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Next, respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their agreement with
certain statements concerning the clarity, consistency, and importance of certain aspects
of homeland security at the local, state, and federal level. Responses were measured on a
scale of 1-5 (1 representing the least agreement and 5 representing the strongest
agreement). Responses indicated the strongest agreement with the statements that
Table 2A:
Descriptive Statistics of Homeland Security Survey (Continued)
Range
Mean
SD
N
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Item
HS Practice and Preparedness
Development of threat management/ assessment program
No
Yes
Don’t Know
Post 9/11 HS/emergency management plan
No
Yes
Don’t Know

68(23%)
133(46%)
90(31%)
39(13%)
186(64%)
67(23%)

Number of recognized HS priority activities
Number of HS agency collaborations
Number of HS training

1-7
1-7
1-8

Post 9/11 enhanced investigation responsibilities
DHS directives are being effectively implemented
Department has good amount of HS training
Involvement in implementing counterterrorism strategies
Frequency of HS local training
Quarterly
Bi-annually
Annually (or less)
Not at all

3.20
3.61
3.78

1.9
1.8
2.1

288
278
268

4-1 (strongly 2.65
agree - strongly 2.73
disagree)
2.29

.950
.803
.979

291
286
289

4-1 (strongly
2.72
agree- strongly
disagree

.894

293

23(8%)
39(13%)
149(52%)
78(27%)

HS Funding
Post 9/11funding allocations
No
Yes
Don’t Know

38(13%)
153(53%)
97(34%)

Post 9/11 requests for HS funding in agency have increased 4-1 (strongly 2.83
.961
284
Post 9/11 resources have better prepared agency
agree – strongly 2.72
.905
288
Post 9/11 resources should target non-rural areas
disagree)
2.71
.933
287
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: All percentages represent valid ones, and descriptive statistics have been rounded to nearest whole number.

homeland security training at the local level is as important as the national level, and
having valid information on terrorism/threat assessment is as important at the local level
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as the national level. Furthermore, the concept of emergency preparedness at the local
level was viewed as most important among respondents, x = 4.3. Respondents were also
asked to select what they viewed as the greatest threats to the federal and local
government. Threat to critical infrastructure proved to be most prominent among the
federal government, while threat to public health was viewed as the greatest potential
threat to local government.
In order to measure the amount of homeland security practices within agencies,
respondents were asked questions regarding the number of homeland security activities
and the frequency of training within their respective agencies. First, respondents were
asked to select what aspects of homeland security they saw as a top priority in their
departments. These ranged from training, planning, communication and information
sharing, to investigative and prosecutorial activities. Results indicated an average of 3.2
top priorities in their departments. Next, respondents were asked which agencies they
collaborated with on homeland security issues, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Defense, and Federal Emergency Management
Administration. Results indicated that agencies collaborated with a x of 3.6 agencies in
relation to homeland security-related issues. Respondents were also asked to report the
number of areas they had homeland security training, such as emergency planning,
biohazard awareness, cyber security, and media communications. Respondents reported a

x of 3.8 training areas.
Respondents were also asked their level of agreement (1 representing strongest
disagreement and 4 representing strongest agreement) with statements concerning the
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effectiveness and implementation of DHS directives in their agencies and how involved
their department is in implementing homeland security strategies. Overall, results
indicated slight disagreement to somewhat moderate agreement regarding post 9/11
enhanced investigation responsibilities, effective DHS directive implementation, whether
or not they felt their agency had a good amount of homeland security training, and
involvement in implementing homeland security related strategies. Finally, 52% reported
that their agency had homeland security related training annually (or less).
Concerning homeland security funding, 53% said that they had received some
amount of homeland security funding since 9/11. Perceptions of homeland security
funding increases were measured on a scale of 1-4 (1 representing strongly disagree and 4
representing strongly agree). When asked if requests for funding had increased in their
agency since 9/11, results produced a x of 2.8, indicating a slight level of disagreement in
regards to funding request increases. Respondents were also asked if they felt that post
9/11 resources have better prepared their agency. The x response was 2.7, once again
indicating no clear level of agreement. Finally, when asked if homeland security funding
should continue to be distributed primarily to non-rural agency, again results indicated
some level of disagreement ( x = 2.7).
Major Variable Coding
Certain variables were recoded into dichotomous, dummy-coded categories in
order to conduct bi-variate and multivariate analysis. Questions measuring respondents’
level of agreement with certain ideological and practical related statements that had
specified values for each category were recoded as 0 = disagree and 1 = agree. These
36

questions consisted of agreement with current allocation of homeland security funding
based on jurisdiction (UALLOCATE), effect of funds’ allocation on homeland security
preparedness in one’s department (ALLOCATE), increases in requests for homeland
security funding in one’s department post 9/11 (REQUESTS), and increases in
departmental investigative responsibilities post 9/11 (RESPONSE). The question “how
involved is your department in implementing counterterrorism and homeland security
strategies?” (STRAT) was recoded to 0 = not involved at all and 1 = involved. Certain
demographic variables were also recoded. Race (RACE) was recoded to 0 = minority and
1 = White, Age (AGE) as 0 = 21-40 and 1 = 41 or older, Gender (GENDER) as 0 =
Female and 1 = Male, and the type of jurisdiction that one’s agency serves (URBAN) as
0 = other and 1 = urban. Respondent’s role within their agency was recoded into two
separate dichotomous variables: field position (FIELD) as 0 = other and 1 = field and
administrative positions (ADMIN) as 0 = other and 1 = administrative.
While other variables, such as those measuring perceptions regarding the clarity
of DHS directives and mission statements at the federal (DHSF), state (DHSS), and local
(or departmental) (DHSD) levels, the importance of homeland security training at the
federal versus the local level (TRAINING), the consistency within the state regarding
homeland security practices (CONSISTENCY), the important of a threat assessment at
the federal versus local level (THREAT), and whether the homeland security mandate
should be the same at the federal as the local level (MANDATE) were used in the bivariate and multivariate analysis, these variables were not recoded. This was due to the
lack of specified values for each category. While respondent’s level of agreement with
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the statements were measured on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 representing the strongest agreement
and 1 representing the strongest disagreement), except for strongest agreement and
strongest disagreement, no specific level of agreement was implied for the other
categories. Therefore, dichotomizing these variables one would have to assume an equal
understanding of the level of agreement in each category among all respondents.
Bi-variate Relationships
A bi-variate analysis was conducted on a variety of variables related to homeland
security practical perceptions, ideology, and agency demographics. Three dependent
variables were used for the correlations (see Tables 3, 3A, and 3B in Appendix B). The
designated dependent variables asked respondents to state their level of agreement on a
scale of 1 to 5 (5 representing the strongest agreement and 1 representing the strongest
disagreement) with statements regarding the clarity of the mission, responsibilities, goals
and strategies of homeland security at the federal (DHSF), state (DHSS), and local (or
departmental) levels (DHSD). The selected variables were used due to their overall
concern with homeland security practical perceptions and ideology across multiple levels.
Correlations were first conducted on variables related to homeland security
practical perceptions (see Table 3). The first variable measured was respondent’s
agreement regarding the continuation of allocating homeland security funds primarily to
non-rural agencies (UALLOCATE). A significant relationship was found only in regard
to the clarity of homeland security at the local level (DHSD) (r = -.192**), indicating a
weak inverse relationship. This indicated that if respondents agreed that funding should
primarily be allocated to non-rural areas, the less likely they felt that there was clarity

38

among homeland security at the local level. Regarding the effects homeland security
funding on agency preparedness (ALLOCATE), a moderate inverse relationship was
found across all dependent variables (DHSF: r = -.324**; DHSS: r = -.342**; DHSD: r =
-.443**) indicating that the more likely one felt that post 9/11 homeland security funding
had better prepared their agency, the less likely they were to feel there was clarity among
homeland security at all levels. Significant relationships were also found between all
dependent variables and increases in funding requests post 9/11. All relationships were
inverse and weak to moderate in strength (DHSF: r = -.165**; DHSS: r = -.260**;
DHSD: r = -.358**). Results indicated that the more likely one feels that funding
requests within their agency had increased since 9/11, the less likely they were to agree
that there is clarity regarding homeland security at any level. Concerning the relationship
between increases in departmental investigative responsibilities and the clarity of
homeland security at the federal level, there was a weak inverse relationship (r = .197**). A weak inverse relationship was also found among state clarity of homeland
security (r = -.237**) and a moderate inverse relationship in regard to clarity of
homeland security at the local level (r = -.437**). In other words, if the respondents
agreed that investigative responsibilities within their department had increased since
9/11, there was less agreement that there was clarity of homeland security at all levels.
While most variables measured agreement with certain statements regarding
homeland security practices, other variables were selected to measure specific
departmental involvement in homeland security related practices. The correlation
between departmental involvement in implementing homeland security strategies
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(STRAT) and clarity of homeland security at the federal level produced a weak positive
relationship (r = .196**), and a weak to moderate positive relationship was found in
relation to clarity of homeland security at the state level (DHSS) (r = .292**). A positive
relationship was also found between departmental involvement in implementing
homeland security strategies and clarity of homeland security at the local level (r =
.492**). The variable measuring the total number of areas that agencies had homeland
security training (TRAIN #), number of agencies collaborated with on homeland security
related issues (COLLAB #), and number of homeland security priorities within
respondent’s agency (PRIORITIES #) was also measured in relation to the
aforementioned dependent variables. The correlation between federal homeland security
clarity (DHSF) and homeland security training activities produced a weak, positive
relationship (r =.200**). Similar relationships were found between COLLAB# (r =
.130*) and PRIORITIES (r = .131*) as related to DHSF. Regarding the correlation
between homeland security clarity at the state level (DHSS) and homeland security
training activities, collaborations, and priorities, analysis produced weak positive
relationships. Bi-variate analysis between homeland security clarity at the departmental
level (DHSD) and agency homeland security training activities, collaborations, and
priorities produced stronger [positive] correlations of .455**, .459**, and .332**,
respectively. Overall results indicated that the more involved one perceives their agency
to be in homeland security related practices, the more they were likely to have stronger
levels of agreement concerning the clarity of homeland security at all levels.
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Next, bi-variate analysis was conducted on variables relating to homeland security
ideology (see Table 3A). Along with the dependent variables (DHSF, DHSS, and
DHSD), four independent variables were selected which covered ideological perceptions
of homeland security at the federal, state, and local levels. These consisted of the
perception of the importance of homeland security training at the federal and local level
(TRAINING), consistency within the state regarding homeland security practices
(CONSISTENCY), whether the homeland security mandate should be the same at the
local level as the national level (MANDATE), and a threat assessment/management plan
is as important at the local level as the national level (THREAT). The correlation
between federal homeland security clarity and homeland security training produced a
weak positive relationship (r = .154**). The same weak positive relationship was found
between state homeland security clarity and homeland security training (r = .123*). These
results indicate that the stronger level of agreement one has that homeland security
training should be the same at the local as the national level, the more likely one is to
have a stronger level of agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the
federal and state levels. Regarding consistency of homeland security practices within the
State, a moderate positive relationship was found in relation to homeland security clarity
at the federal level (r = .495**). However, a stronger positive relationship was found with
regard to homeland security clarity at the state level and CONSISTENCY (r = .630**),
with a moderate positive relationship exhibited at the departmental level (r = .552**). In
other words, the more likely one was to agree that there is consistency within the state
regarding homeland security practices, the more likely one was to agree that there is
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clarity among homeland security at all levels. The relationship between whether the
homeland security mandate should be the same at the local as the national level and
federal, state, and local homeland security clarity produced weak positive relationships
(DHSF: r = .249**; DHSS: r = .220**; DHSD: r = .174**). The same can be said for the
importance of a threat assessment/management plan at the local versus the federal level,
which produced weak positive relationships in regard to federal, state, and local
homeland security clarity (DHSF r = .189**, DHSS r = .147*, DHSD r = .128*).
Overall, results indicated that the stronger the level of agreement one has that the
homeland security mandate should be the same at the local as the national level and that
the existence of a threat assessment/management plan is as important at the local as
national level, the stronger the level of agreement one had that there is clarity among
homeland security at all levels.
Finally, bi-variate analysis was conducted on the relationship between agency
demographic variables and the dependent variables. Regarding the dependent variable of
federal homeland security clarity (DHSF), significance was only found in relation to
gender (r = .143*). This weak positive relationship indicated that if a respondent was
male, the more likely they were to have a higher level of agreement that there is clarity
among homeland security at the federal level. A weak positive relationship was also
found between whether one has an administrative role within their agency (ADMIN) and
clarity of homeland security in one’s department (r = .120*), indicating that
administrators were more likely to agree that there was clarity among homeland security
objectives at the local level.
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Multivariate Analysis
Following the bi-variate analysis, linear regression was used to further test the
relationship between the dependent variables of DHSF, DHSS, and DHSD and the
predictor variables in the study (See Table 4). Conceptualization of the three models was
derived from bi-variate analysis. Practice, perception, ideological, and organizational
demographic variables which exhibited significant correlations to one of the dependent
criterion variables (DHSF, DHSS, or DHSD) were placed in each of the three linear
regression models. Because of the extremely high correlations between DHSF and
DHSS, only one of these variables was used in model 3 (DHSD) to avoid the problem of
multicollinearity. Of the demographic variables, RACE, AGE, and GENDER, only
gender was bi-variately related to one of the criterion variables, but due to the fact that
these variables often exhibit interactive effects, all three were included in each model.
In model 1, the dependent variable of DHSF was used. This model was significant and
produced an r squared of .611, explaining about 60% of the variance. The variables of
whether homeland security funding had better prepared respondent’s agency
(ALLOCATE), whether post 9/11 responsibilities have increased (RESPONSE),
cumulative number of departmental collaborations (COLLAB #), and clarity of homeland
security at the state and departmental level (DHSS) proved to be significant predictor
variables in relation to federal homeland security clarity (DHSF). These results indicated
that as agreement that there was clarity among homeland security at the federal level
increased, agreement that post 9/11 officer/investigative responsibilities had increased,
homeland security funding had better prepared one’s agency, and the number of
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Table 4:
OLS Regression Models of Homeland Security Clarity, Practices, Ideology, and Demographic Factors
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
DHSF

DHSS

DHSD

B

(SE)

B

(SE)

B

(SE)

UALLOCATE

-.030

.093

.049

.074

.008

.104

ALLOCATE

-.141*

.120

.045

.097

-.116*

.135

REQUESTS

.085

.120

-.038

.096

.005

.136

RESPONSE

-.106*

.107

.080*

.086

.124*

.120

STRAT

-.050

.116

-.010

.093

-.143*

TRAINING #

.053

.024

-.045

.019

COLLAB #

-.126*

.029

.097*

.023

.101*

.033

PRIORITIES #

-.012

.025

.019

.020

.054

.028

TRAINING

.006

.056

-.040

.045

-.029

.063

CONSISTENCY

.013

.052

218**

.040

.307**

.052

MANDATE

.035

.041

.023

.033

.002

.046

THREAT

.064

.065

.000

.052

.011

.073

RACE
AGE
GENDER
ADMIN
FIELD
URBAN

.002
.003
.047
-.020
-.021
-.014

.122
.097
.115
.103
.105
.088

-.055
-.044
.038
-.010
.026
.036

.097
.077
.091
.081
.083
.070

.016
.049
-.024
.046
-.038
-.020

.137
.108
.129
.115
.118
.099

.519**

.039

.175**

.054

.762**
-.081

.062
.060

.313**

.045

Variables
Practices

.130

.152**

.026

Ideology
.

Demographics

DHSF
DHSS
DHSD
F Ratio
R2

19.571**

34.565**

17.665**

.611

.735

.572

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

departmental collaborations on homeland security issues decreased. However, as
agreement as agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the federal level
increased, as did agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the state
level.
Next, the dependent variable of DHSS was used. This model proved to be
significant as well and produced an r squared of .735, explaining about 74% of the
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variance. In this model, the variables of whether post 9/11 investigative responsibilities
increased (RESPONSE), cumulative number of agency collaborations (COLLAB #),
state consistency regarding homeland security practices (CONSISTENCY), clarity of
homeland security at the federal level (DHSF) and clarity of homeland security at the
departmental level (DHSD) proved to be significant predictor variables. Results indicated
that as agreement with the aforementioned variables and number agency collaborations
increased, so did agreement that there is clarity concerning homeland security at the state
level.
Finally, the dependent variable of agreement that there was clarity regarding the
homeland security mission at the departmental level (DHSD) was used. This model was
also significant and produced an r squared of .572, explaining about 57% of the variance.
Even though this model explained the least amount of the variance, it had the most
predictor variables that were significant. These consisted of whether homeland security
funding had better prepared one’s agency to handle threat (ALLOCATE), whether post
9/11 investigative responsibilities had increased (RESPONSE), departmental
involvement in implementing homeland security strategies (STRAT), number of
homeland security related training activities (TRAINING), number of agency
collaborations on homeland security related issues (COLLAB #), consistency within the
state regarding homeland security practices, and homeland security clarity at the federal
level. Similar to its relationship with DHSF, the variable of whether post 9/11 funding
had better prepared one’s agency produced an inverse relationship with the dependent
variable of DHSD. However, all other significant predictor variables in this model
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produced positive relationships. Even though a high number of variables proved to be
significant, this may be due to other interdepartmental influences that, due to research
design, cannot be accounted for in this analysis.
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Chapter V
Discussion
As previously stated, this study attempted to determine significant predictors
regarding perceived clarity of homeland security missions and goals of federal, state, and
local (or departmental level) law enforcement objectives, as well as identify
demographic, ideological, and practical factors that may influence the nature of these
belief systems. More specifically, it attempted to determine if a consensus exists
concerning the perceived missions and goals of homeland security at the various law
enforcement levels and if there is a relative level of agreement for homeland security
policy and practical perceptions. The factors significantly impacting overall perceived
mission and strategic clarity of homeland security as an emergent law enforcement
mandate were also examined. To begin with, consistency was found among most
ideological variables. This is evident with variables measuring clarity of homeland
security at the multiple levels of law enforcement, the importance of prevention,
protection, and preparation at varying levels, and those regarding the homeland security
mandate, training, and local threat information. Moderate to strong levels of agreement
were found across all variables, with the exception of whether homeland security related
training and having valid threat assessment/management information was as important at
the local as the federal level, with stronger levels of agreement found among these
variables. In summation, findings from the study indicate consistent moderate to strong
levels of agreement across all levels of law enforcement in relation to most homeland
security ideological perceptions.
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Just as consistency was found among variables regarding the perceived mission
and goals of homeland security, consistency was found among variables measuring
policy and practical perception of homeland security. Respondents indicated an average
of about three to four homeland security priority activities within their agencies,
collaborations on homeland security issues, and homeland security related training
activities. Furthermore, respondents indicated moderate levels of agreement with
variables measuring post 9/11 enhanced investigative responsibilities, the effective
implementation of homeland security directives within their agency, involvement in
implementing post 9/11 counterterrorism strategies, and whether their department has a
good amount of homeland security related training. Moderate levels of agreement were
also found among variables related to homeland security funding, such agency post 9/11
funding request increases, whether post 9/11 resources have better prepared one’s
agency, and whether post 9/11 resources should continue to target non-rural areas.
Several variables were found to significantly impact one’s perception regarding
clarity of homeland security as well. Regarding the clarity of homeland security at the
federal level, results indicated that there as agreement that there is clarity increased, there
was less belief that funding had better prepared one’s agency, belief that
officer/investigator responsibilities had not increased, a lower number of collaborations
on homeland security related issues, and higher levels of agreement that there is
homeland security clarity at the state level. As clarity of homeland security at the state
level increased, there were perceived new officer/investigator responsibilities, a higher
number of agency collaborations, perceived consistency of homeland security practices
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within the state, and that there was clarity of homeland security at the federal level.
Finally, as agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the departmental
level increased, as did agreement that officers/investigators have significantly new
responsibilities, that there is consistency within the state regarding homeland security
practices, clarity among homeland security at the federal level, and number of agency
collaborations and training activities. However, there was less belief that funding had
better prepared one’s agency and less perceived involvement of homeland security in
one’s department. Most notably, the dependent variable of respondent’s perception of
departmental homeland security clarity, followed closely by state homeland security
clarity, had the highest number of variables that predicted homeland security clarity.
Other aspects of the research produced interesting results as well. First, it is
important to note that results only indicated moderate levels of agreement at best
regarding perceptions of homeland security ideology, policy, and practice, with the
exception of whether homeland security related training and having valid threat
assessment/management information was as important at the local as the federal level,
with relatively strong levels of agreement found among these variables. While this could
indicate somewhat of a concern for threat among respondents and a modest level of
interest or concern for homeland security as a whole, this study did not measure
perceptions of threat among respondents; therefore, one can only speculate as to such
concerns.
Next, even though relative levels of agreement were expressed across most
variables, some variation was seen among variables measuring practical perceptions. For
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example, when asked if post 9/11 resources had better prepared one’s agency to handle
threats, results indicated an inverse relationship with homeland security clarity. This is
interesting due to the positive relationship that other similar variables concerned with
ideological and practical perceptions had with perceptions of clarity in general, such as
number of homeland security training activities, agency collaborations at the state and
local level, and perceptions of increases in officer/investigator responsibilities at the state
and local level.
Furthermore, in the multivariate analysis, a significantly higher number of
variables proved to be predictors of departmental homeland security clarity as opposed to
homeland security clarity at the federal level. Results also indicated that consistency of
the federal homeland security mission is not predicated by higher local involvement,
while the State model indicated that consistency of homeland security practices within
the state and belief about new roles and collaborations are the best predictors. The
Departmental model also observed tangibles such as training, responsibilities,
collaborations, and consistency of state practices, but also indicated that less funding and
less overall involvement defined departmental homeland security clarity. This may be
due to other interdepartmental influences that, due to research design, cannot be
accounted for in this analysis, such as lack of exposure to or understanding of the
specifics of the broader concept of the federal homeland security mandate. However, this
also lends credibility to the assumption that respondents inferred Federal clarity as a
general concept, while State and Departmental clarity were inferred as more contextual or
specific in relation to the major variables. Finally, agency size was found not to be a
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significant predictor of perceptions of homeland security clarity. Due to the prominence
of homeland security funding and practices in urban compared to rural areas, one might
assume that this would have significantly impacted perceptions regarding the clarity of
homeland security.
Due to the nature of this study as exploratory research and the lack of empirical
analysis concerning ideological, political, and practical perceptions of homeland security,
findings are not comparable to most of extant research. Currently, most studies
concerning homeland security at the local/departmental level have either focused on the
concept of homeland security and its overall effect on the policing institution, or been
limited to examining its relationship to perceptions of threat, certain departmental
activities, or specific demographic criteria (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Oliver, 2009;
Stewart & Morris, 2009; Schaefer et al., 2009). This study, however, not only attempted
to identify demographic, ideological, and practical factors that may influence homeland
security perceptions at the departmental level, but their relation to perceptions regarding
the clarity of homeland security across multiple levels of law enforcement as well.
Even though the nature of this research differs considerably in comparison to
other studies of homeland security issues, similar demographic variables were used in
this analysis due to their significant relationship with variables regarding homeland
security perceptions in other studies (Schaefer et al., 2009; Stewart & Morris, 2009). One
of these variables was type of jurisdiction. While it proved to be a significant predictor in
the previous literature, it did not prove to be significant in this analysis. Furthermore,
while type of agency also proved to be significant in previous studies, it was not chosen
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for the bi-variate or multivariate analysis in this research. This was due to its similarity in
findings with type of jurisdiction in the descriptive analysis. Type of jurisdiction can also
be generalized to agency type, with municipal departments policing urban areas and
sheriff’s departments typically policing more rural communities; therefore, another
variable concerning type of community policed was not deemed necessary.
Furthermore, even though this study is inherently different than the research
conducted by Brown (2007) and Oliver (2006) on the effects of homeland security
policies and practices on the policing institution, it reiterates the importance of the
question posed by their research: have homeland security policing practices ushered in a
new era of policing?. For example, the high number of variables found to predict clarity
of homeland security at the departmental versus the federal level in this analysis may
indicate that more specific, contextual variables influence perceptions of homeland
security throughout local law enforcement. While the arguments by Brown (2007) and
Oliver (2006) stated that homeland security policing practices have either reinforced the
community policing era or ushered in a new era all together, results from this study
extend that argument by also identifying a need for better understanding of perceptions of
homeland security policies and practices and their potential implications throughout the
local law enforcement environment.
As previously stated, there are some limitations to this study, most notably its
distribution via email. The sampling frame was affected by a number of the surveys being
viewed as “spam mail”, either by the recipient’s email server or the recipients
themselves, which is one of the major drawbacks to electronic survey delivery.
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Furthermore, this study asked questions related to funding allocation and perceptions of
departmental policies and practices. Even though confidentiality and anonymity were
assured to all respondents, the response rate could have potentially been limited due to
respondent’s concern with providing information on what may have been viewed as
“sensitive”, private, or even too political by some.
In conclusion, this study attempted to determine significant predictors of
perceived clarity of homeland security of federal, state, and local law enforcement
objectives as well as identify demographic, ideological, and practical factors that
potentially influence such perceptions. Currently, homeland security research in local law
enforcement is limited at best. However, studies such as this that seek to identify multiple
influences on homeland security perceptions, policies, and practical implementation can
have a dramatic effect on homeland security in local law enforcement. They can provide
valuable insight as to what influences the perceived effectiveness of program
implementation, allow for better allocation of funds, and lead to the development of
programs that better fit the needs of individual communities while staying consistent with
federal, state, and local homeland security mandates.
As the threat of terrorism throughout the world continues to evolve, so must the
concept of homeland security, and research such as this will allow for better overall
understanding and preparation to meet the challenges of this evolving mandate. .
Whereas the extant research has considered the relevance of homeland security as a
dominant police strategy, the present study has focused on perceived clarity related to the
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concept. It would appear logical that the answer to the latter question intuitively impacts
the answer to the former.
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APPENDIX A
Homeland Security Survey
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Dear Police Professional:
Attached to this email is a web link containing a survey on homeland security concepts,
policies, and practices. The research is being conducted by the Department of Criminal
Justice at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. The research is also supported by
the Tennessee Association of Chiefs of Police (TACP), the Southeastern Command and
Leadership Academy (SECLA), as well as the Law Enforcement Innovation Center
(LEIC) in Knoxville. This research is an attempt to describe homeland security issues in
local law enforcement from the perspective of individual officers. Your experience as a
law enforcement practitioner/supporter makes your opinion quite valuable. If possible,
we would like to include you in our study.
Although we have asked for certain demographic and organizational information, please
be assured that this information will be handled in an anonymous and confidential
manner. Likewise, we will not identify any agency in any printed materials. Our
immediate goal is to produce research findings that will be of value both academically
and practically.
We have followed the process required by our institution (The University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga) for conducting this type of research project and institutional approval is on
file with the Chair of the Institutional Review Board, Dr. M. D. Roblyer, who can be
contacted at (423) 425-5567.
Respectfully yours,

Vic W. Bumphus, Ph.D
Associate Professor
&
Adam Baldwin
Graduate Research Assistant

Please indicate your willingness to complete the survey by accessing the following web
link at:

http://dhs.speedsurvey.com
Thanks! For your time and Consideration.
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
(FWA00004149) has approved this research project # 10-009
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Please help us serve you better by taking a few moments to fill out this survey form.
The results will be returned to us automatically via the web.
The tasks of counterterrorism and homeland security are typically grouped into what
are known as the 3 P's: prevention (preventing terrorist attacks), protection
(protecting targets of potential attacks), and preparation (preparing for quick
response and recovery after a potential attack). How would you rate the order of
importance among the federal government?
Most
important

Important

Least
important

Prevention
Protection
Preparation

How would you rank the importance of prevention, protection, and preparation in
your department?
Most
important

Important

Least
important

Prevention
Protection
Preparation

In your opinion, what level of emphasis does your department place on homeland
security concepts and strategies?
No emphasis
Low-level emphasis
Moderate emphasis
High-level emphasis

Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements, with 5
representing the strongest agreement and 1 representing the strongest disagreement.
5
The mission, responsibilities, strategies,
and/or goals of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) are clearly
understood or defined.
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4

3

2

1

The mission and responsibilities of state
and local homeland security strategies
and/or goals are clearly defined or
understood.
The mission, responsibilities, strategies,
and/or goals of your department's
homeland security vision is clearly
understood or defined.
The homeland security mandate should be
the same at the local level as on the
national level.
Homeland security training is as
important at local level as on the national
level.
Having valid information on
terrorism/threat assessment is as
important at the local level as on the
national level.
There is a good amount of consistency
within the State regarding homeland
security practices.
The homeland security activities in my
State are consistent with the State mission
statement.
The homeland security activities in my
department are consistent with the
department's mission statement or policy
objectives.
Please indicate the importance of the following concepts related to homeland security
at the local level, 5 (highest) and 1 (lowest).
5

4

3

2

1

Emergency preparedness
Terrorism prevention
Border patrol
Disaster relief

What do you consider to be the greatest potential threat to the national government?
Terrorist threat to government buildings or installations
Terrorist threat to critical infrastructure
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Terrorist threat to public health
None

What do you consider to be the greatest potential threat to your local government?
Terrorist threat to government buildings or installations
Terrorist threat to critical infrastructure
Terrorist threat to public health
None

Since 9/11, has your department developed a comprehensive homeland security
related plan or amended your existing emergency management plan?
Yes
No
Don't know

How involved is your department in implementing counterterrorism and homeland
security strategies?
Very involved
Somewhat involved
Hardly involved
Not involved

Which of the following aspects of homeland security would you consider to be a top
priority in your department? (Check all that apply)
Planning
Training
Equipment (HAZMAT, decontamination, etc.)
Communication (interoperability, data, community mobilization, etc.)
Intelligence/information (intelligence gathering and analysis, sensor monitoring,
etc.)
Response/recovery (primary and secondary response to incidents and disasters)
Investigation/prosecution (proactive and reactive investigation of incidents and
crimes)
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Does your department currently have a threat management/assessment program?
Yes
No
Don't know

Since 9/11, officers/investigations in your agency have significantly new
responsibilities in responding to terrorist events.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

Please check the following agencies/organizations that your local government
collaborates with on homeland security issues. (Check all that apply)
Other local governments
Local military installations
State government agencies
FBI/DOJ
DHS/FEMA
DOD
Non governmental agencies

You are confident that the DHS directives are being effectively implemented and
adequately supported within your department.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

In which of the following areas does your local government have training? (Check all
that apply)
Emergency planning, preparedness, response
Biohazard awareness/identification
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Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosives attacks/responses
Critical infrastructure response
Grant development and writing
Cyber security
Media communications
Coordination of volunteer efforts/donations

Your department has a great deal of mandatory homeland security and
counterterrorism training.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

How often does your department have homeland security or counterterrorism
training?
Quarterly
Bi-annually
Annually (or less frequent)
Not at all

Since 9/11, your department has received homeland security funding.
Yes
No
Don't know

Requests for homeland security in your agency has increased compared to funding
prior to 9/11.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
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The resources that have been allocated to your department have prepared your agency
to better handle possible terrorist attacks.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

The overwhelming majority of homeland security resources have been allocated
towards non-rural areas. Do you think resources should continue to be distributed in
this manner?
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree

Type of Agency
Municipal
County
Consolidated
Emergency/medical
Fire/safety
Other

Approximately, how many sworn staff does your department employ?
0-30
31-99
100 +

How would you characterize the jurisdiction your department serves?
Urban
Rural
Suburban
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Role within your agency.
Field position
Part field/part administrative position
Administrative position
Other

How long have you been working with your agency?
1-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16 + years

How long have you worked in your current profession?
1-5 years
5-10 years
11-15 years
16 + years

Age
21-30
31-40
41-50
50 or older

Highest level of education achieved.
High School/GED
Some college
Bachelor's degree

Race
Black
White
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Hispanic
Other

Gender
Male
Female

Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey.
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APPENDIX B:
Supplemental Tables
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Table 3:
Bi-variate Correlations of Homeland Security Practice Perceptions and Clarity
Variables
X1

X2

X3

X4

X5

X6

X7

X8

X1

DHSF

X2

DHSS

.742**

X3

DHSD

.438**

.646**

X4

UALLOCATE

-.095

-.084

-.192**

X5

ALLOCATE

-.324**

-.342**

-.443**

.324**

X6

REQUESTS

-.165**

-.260**

-.358**

.164**

.569**

X7

RESPONSE

-.197**

-.237**

-.437**

.137*

.322**

.411**

X8

STRAT

.196**

.292**

.492**

-.243**

-.427**

-.453**

-.483**

X9

TRAIN #

.200**

.268**

.455**

-.176**

-.306**

-.264**

-.259**

.359**

X9

X10

COLLAB #

.130*

.287**

.459**

-.169**

-.382**

-.351**

-.332**

.440**

.586**

X11

PRIORITIES #

.131*

.233**

.332**

-.097

-.128*

-.201**

-.267**

.230**

.330**

*p< .05; **p< .01 (2-talied)
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X10

.352**

X11

Table 3A:
Bi-variate Correlations of Homeland Security Ideological Perceptions and Perceptions of Clarity
____________________________________________________________________________________
Variables
X1

X2

X3

X 12

X 13

X1

DHSF

X2

DHSS

.742**

X3

DHSD

.438**

.646**

X 12

TRAINING

.154**

.123*

.099

X 13

CONSISTENCY

.495**

.630**

.552**

.158**

X 14

MANDATE

.249**

.220**

.174**

.416**

.225**

X 15

THREAT

.189**

.147*

.128*

.630**

.089

*p< .05; **p< .01 (2-talied)
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X 14

.431**

X 15

Table 3B
Correlations of Agency Demographics
Variables

X1

X2

X3

X15

X16

X17

X18

X1

DHSF

X2

DHSS

.742**

X3

DHSD

.438**

.646**

X15

RACE

-.056

-.101

-.033

X16

AGE

-.100

-.093

.028

-.026

X17

GENDER

.143*

.105

.037

.209**

-.061

.007

*

.014

.209**

-.066

**

.071

-.386**

-.033

.003

X18

ADMIN

-.022

.120

X19

FIELD

.018

.036

-.072

-.002

X20

URBAN

.068

.105

.111

-.152**

*p< .05; **p< .01 (2-talied)
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-.202

.029

X19

.087

X20

APPENDIX C
Department of Homeland Security
Organizational Chart
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